#155
       155. DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE PASSING OF THE OLD
                                       REGIME, 1869-1870
AFTER 1800 till the downfall of the feudal regime in 1867-1868, there is little of interest to record
of Iriki.   The twenty-seventh lord Sadatsune was succeeded by Sadayoshi(?), 1822-1889, and
Kimihiro, 1836-1871.   During their lifetime supervened the great revolution of the empire.
   This is not a place to recount the stirring events which followed the forcible opening of Japan
to the outer world in 1854, and which culminated fourteen years later in the surrender to the
emperor by the Tokugawa sho-gun of all his political power.   Nor shall we tarry to describe the
prominent part which was taken in this great national upheaval by the Shimadzu lords and their
followers:   they were among the chief destroyers of the Tokugawa rule and makers of the new
regime.   These things belong to the history of the Japanese nation as a whole.
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   However, the sudden and sweeping changes that came over the institutions at Iriki occurred at
the same moment in all parts of the country.   With a view, therefore, to revealing a little of the
broad background of these changes, we have selected a few documents of large bearing which are
of the utmost significance in this brief period of national revolution.   The document A, undated but
probably written in the middle of 1867, is a memorandum prepared by the sho-gun's council in
order to acquaint the diplomatic agents of foreign Powers, with whom it had been thrown into
active contact, with the peculiar semi-feudal polity of Japan, its origin, its justification, and the
general outline of its organization.   This singular document was probably penned by some one who,
being somewhat more familiar than his colleagues with the European way of understanding, tried,
to the best of his ability, to adapt his language to the main purpose of his composition.   The terms
mikado,1 for the emperor, and taki-kun,2 for the sho-gun, were deliberately used throughout, for,
informal and improper as these words were, they had already gained currency among the foreigners.
Despite the shortcomings of the document, which were largely due to its peculiar aims and its
unwonted manner of presentaion, it would be difficult to find another piece of writing in existence
which reveals more intimately and more accurately the point of view of the shogunate at the
moment when it was struggling desperately for existence.   It will be most instructive to compare the
ideas of this memorandum with those of C.
   By the document B, dated later in 1867, the last of the Tokugawa sho-gun, Yoshinobu,3 yielded his
government of Japan to the emperor two hundred and sixty-seven years after its assumption by his
ancestor Ieyasu (No. 151).   Behind the cramped language of this memorial, an observant eye should
detect a psychological cause which, furthered by a series of unfortunate events which the writer
could hardly control, resulted in the next year in his forced retirement and complete effacement
from the subsequent political life of the nation.   To these events we have no space to refer.   (It
should be added here that, on 13 July of this year, the government granted to Iesato, the heir of
Yoshinobu, 700,000 koku of land, consisting of the whole of Suruga and parts of Totomi and
Mutsu.)
   When the new government came into existence in 1867, it was embarrassed by its extremely
meager financial resources, while the colossal task of national reconstruction which confronted it was
as costly as it was difficult.   The government had a direct control over lands whose annual pro-
ductivity was registered as only seven and a half million koku, out of the total taka of more than
thirty million of feudal Japan, and could derive only two million koku of yearly revenue;4 for the
greater part of the economic land of the realm was in the hands of the local barons.   (At the same
time, the income from the customs duties was inconsiderable:   the Western powers had imposed
upon Japan a customs tariff which had been dictated by the interest of the foreign trader.)   It was
at this juncture, early in 1869, that the barons of Satsuma, Nagato(Cho-su), Hizen, and Tosa,
proposed voluntarily to yield their hereditary domains to the imperial government.   The document C
is the joint memorial which these high-spirited lords presented to the throne; therein is recorded
their devotion to the enlightened policy of national unity and centralized government,38 with which,
in their clear vision, the feudal territorial rule in the form in which it still existed under the new
government seemed incompatible.   By the document D, the imperial council accepted the offer of the
Shimadzu baron, at the same time granting him a taka of 100,000 koku (F), and appointing his
uncle46 governor of the old baronial territory (E).   The worthy example set by these four was soon
followed by other barons, and the rest were ordered to do the same, between 1869 and 1870.
   All the barons (dai-myo) of the country,as well as the civil nobles (ku-gyo) of the imperial court,
were now classed together as the kwa-zoku (literally, flower families), and the barons' vassals of
all grades were called shi-zoku and sotsu-zoku (families of samurai and of lower warriors:   later the
term sotsu-zoku was discontinued).   The barons, like the Shimadzu, were appointed governor(chi-
han-zhi or han chi-zhi) of their recent fiefs(han), receiving annuities equivalent for the most part to
about a tenth of their former incomes from the taka.   The baron-governors exercised discretion in
providing for the shi-zoku in their respective spheres out of their own annuities and of those specially
appropriated by the government for that purpose.   The document G regarding Iriki-in Kimihiro is
an illustration.
   This anomalous condition was quickly changed, for the maintenance of the 263 han and their
hereditary chiefs, even in their altered status, was incongruous with the spirit of the new age that
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had dawned.   The han were abolished in 1871, and, in their place, 3 fu(great cities) and 301 ken
(prefectures) were organized, the latter being reduced later in the year to 72; and the baron-
governors were relieved of their official duties, and required to have their residences in Tokyo, the
former seat of the shogunate but now the imperial Capital.47
   Since all the old barons and samurai had given up their domains and emoluments by 1876, it
had become incumbent upon the government to recompense them in some manner.   This was at first
done by means of annuities and public bonds.   Although the various baronies characteristically
reported that their old annual revenues had been only 22.6 million yen in value, while their actual
incomes could hardly have been less than 34.5 million, the burden assumed by the new government
of supporting the old feudal classes was onerous even at the former rate, amounting in 1876, for
example, to nearly 30 per cent of the total revenue from all sources.   In that year, all the annuities
were definitively converted to public bonds, which aggregated the face-value of some 175 million
yen, and yielded an annual income of 17.5 million for 323,445 persons, including about 5.2 million
yen for 552 kwa-zoku and 12.2 million for 310,971 shi-zoku.5   The bonds were redeemable in thirty
years, and bore interests ranging from five to seven per cent for five to fourteen years according to
the income of the holder, the smaller holders receiving the more favorable considerations.   Supple-
mentary pension bonds bearing a five per cent interest, redeemable between 1910 and 1959, to the
total amount of 286,300 yen, were issued in 1905 for those former feudal persons who had received
grossly inadequate or no bonds.6   The new government also assumed the debts of the old han
contracted between 1844 and 1872, which were about 23.4 million yen; for these, too, bonds of
different terms were issued.7   The old annuities, the values of the pension bonds, and the loan bonds
just referred to, together amounted to 233.9 million yen; and that was the pecuniary price which
the new regime paid to the old for its legacy of domanial land and population.
   The old commoners have been designated hei-min; and were recognized as the legal owners of
the lands which they had been cultivating under their titles as hyaku-sho.   The class divisions of the
kwo-zoku(members of the imperial families), kwa-zoku, shi-zoku, and hei-min, are, however, only
social, for before law all are equal.   Iriki-in Kimihiro and his children, therefore, took their places as
citizens of the empire on an equal footing with his recent vassals and peasants, though naturally
enjoying their deep respect in all social relations.   His second successor, Mr. Iriki-in Shigemitsu, just
deceased (1925), was the thirty-first head of the illustrious family whose residence in this spot dates
back to the beginning of Japan's feudal ages.




#155-A
                                            A*
           (Tokugawa Yoshinobu ko den, VII, 116-122, from the diary of Hirayama Yoshitada.)
   "As regards the ancient history of Japan, although its materials are incomplete and
it is not possible to learn its detail, [it is known that], after the first [sovereign]
Iware-hiko no Mikoto8 ruled over this land twenty-five centuries ago,9 the [successive]
emperors1 [continued] for more than a thousand years to govern the country in
person.
   "Thereafter, as the family of ministers10 grasped all power, there was a continual
turmoil in the various regions, and the people were unable to support themselves.
Therefore,11 the house of Minamoto12 for the first time rose up.   Thenceforward, all
powers of land, wealth, arms, and law were wholly entrusted13 to it, and the emperors
have never concerned themselves14 with them.   This is true unto this day, after more
than six hundred and eighty years.15   It is a natural result that, by the will of Heaven
and the wishes of men,11 a totally different world has thus been evolved.16
   "since [the rise of] the Minamoto to the present generation, several houses17 have
succeeded one another.   During this interval, for about four hundred years,18 men were
scarce who had sufficient virtue19 to govern the country and save the people, but
[chieftains] merely quarreled for ascendency.   Therefore, toward the end of the Ashi-
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kaga age, the land was plunged in complete darkness, there being no peaceful day and
all people being sunk in utmost suffering.
   "That was why Heaven awaited the coming of the Divine Prince To-sho,20 who
saved the world and led the people to joy.21   From his unification till this day, for two
hundred and sixty years, all people have sung praises of peace.   It is needless to
eulogize his high virtue 19 and great deed, which surpassed everything in the past ages.
   "The Divine Prince won [the rule of] the country solely and naturally by his high
virtue;19 he did not [simply] inherit the work of the Minamoto and their successors.
His statesmanship was broad, and his prowess was great, beyond all things since the
beginning of the country; all people obeyed him, as the rivers flow to a lower level,
and all classes rejoiced, as if clouds had parted and the sun had been revealed.   It was
but natural justice that the emperor rewarded his merit with the work of the tai-kun2
which had come down from the house of Minamoto.21
   "Therefore, the possession of all powers by the Divine Prince was to be compared
neither with the arbitrary authority of the ancient family of ministers,10 who in reality
did not command a single warrior or a single foot of territory; nor with the compulsion
of the people which the Minamoto and their successors exercised by means of the
forces of the chieftains.   He truly unified all people, who upheld him as their ruler by
common accord.21
   "After his demise, the tai-kun of the day, leading all the dai-myo of the land, deified
and established his spirit on Mt. Nikko; the whole nation followed them and gave
tributes; the emperor, also, praising his virtue, sent envoys bearing offerings, and con-
ferred the religious title To-sho gu.20   Even now, the emperor does not forget the great
service rendered [by the Divine Prince] to the country, but on every anniversary sends
envoys and presents offerings, as if to his own ancestral deities; this ceremony is ob-
served to this day.   The dai-myo also have each in his domain erected temples dedi-
cated to the spirit.   All within the realm who are grateful for his grace and virtue19 have
for hundreds of years revered and remembered him, as bereaved children do their
loving mother.
   "The emperors have not concerned themselves14 in government already for more
than six hundred and eighty years.   However, as they have been, since the foundation
of the state, the supreme sovereigns following in a single line of divine succession and
for ever unalterable, and as they are revered by the nation like heavenly deities, like-
wise the successive tai-kun on occasions lead dai-myo and pay them court.   The em-
peror entrusts13 to the tai-kun all political powers, and awaits his decisions in silence;
the tai-kun, holding all the political powers of the country, maintains the virtue of
humility, and upholds the emperor with the utmost respect.   This is the foundation of
the profound peace of the country.
   "More than six hundred years ago; the emperor of the day, being displeased with the
control of political power by the military, raised an army and sought to defeat them,
but failed.22   A hundred years thereafter, the same thing occurred, and the military
were for a time defeated; but as the imperial rewards and punishments were not just,
and as the minds of men had for long been loyal to the military, the emperor again
lost power in a few years,23 and the house of Ashikage appeared, and controlled politi-
P375
cal power, as the house of Minamoto had done.   Thereafter, some chieftains of evil
design, knowing that the emperor was the supreme sovereign, tried to uphold him and
thereby to realize their ambitions; but, since their acts issued from selfishness, they
merely succeeded in disturbing the peace.
   "As regards the dai-myo of the present day.   When formerly the family of ministers10
abused power and political order was relaxed, great local chiefs rose up in mutual
rivalry and attached themselves to the Minamoto; the name dai-myo began at that
time.   But their position was not like that of the present territorial lords.24   As the house
of Ashikaga won the country by means of the forces of the chieftains of the time, it
rewarded their services by giving them [rule over] several kuni; thus began a terri-
torial rule24 in a certain measure.   After that, the country was split into contending
sections, and was plunged into a great turmoil. When the Divine Prince unified them
all, he exterminated all the refractory chieftains and retained the obedient, established
anew his faithful subjects and relatives, and controlled them all, both great and small,
strong and weak.   Furthermore, he added a rule of centralized local administration.25
Founding thus a system of a strong trunk and weak branches, all the nooks and corners
of the realm, without the exception of a single foot of land and single person, were
comprised within the control of the tai-kun.   For this reason, the rule excels in perfec-
tion any institution ancient or modern.
   "The dai-myo, although endued with the power to administer their domains and to
guard their territory, are obliged to follow the tai-kun's command in all things great
and small.   Moreover, there are regulations of military service, so that, in case of need,
they must raise warriors in response to his summons.   In time of peace, [the dai-myo]
must guard their domains, and must not privately mobilize their forces.   They have
their houses in Edo, where they maintain their families; they themselves come to Edo
and wait upon the tai-kun for one year, and for the next year are granted leave and
return to their domains to see their government.   Neither marriage, majority,26 suc-
cession, nor any other act at a good or ill fortune, can be performed privately in the
domains, but all must await the tai-kun's sanction by personal attendance at Edo.
When the father dies, the son begs to succeed to his estate, and the tai-kun orders its
confirmation.   If [a dai-myo] is guilty, he is transferred or dispossessed, according to
the tai-kun's will.   As for the office and rank [of a dai-myo], the tai-kun recommends
him to the emperor according to his merit or his length of service; the emperor only
accepts the tai-kun's word, and never gives and takes by his own will.
   "Since [the rise of] the Divine Prince down to the present tai-kun3 there have been
fifteen successive [tai-kun].   At each succession, the emperor has sent to Edo court
nobles of high rank, who announced that political affairs were entrusted13 [to the new
tai-kun] as they had been to his predecessor, and gave formal felicitations.   All the
dai-myo also have tendered congratulations.   Then the new tai-kun has given to them
and all the Shinto temples and Buddhist churches in the country which held land
within his domains [charters bearing his] seal in vermilion27 confirming their posses-
sions as heretofore.   The dai-myo also have presented letters of oath vowing their single-
hearted fealty.   Beginning with [the lords of] Kaga28 and other large han, all [the
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barons] have had audience with the tai-kun as his liege subjects.   There has been no
departure from these customs.
   "The support of the emperor and the family-allowances of the court nobility are all
provided by the tai-kun, who appoints officials specially charged with this matter, and
makes them reside near the emperor and manage this affair.
   "The emperors not having concerned themselves14 with the government of the
country for many ages, and many a disturbance having intervened, the palace had
fallen in decay, nobles of the court had fled and wandered, and the historic Capital
had been laid desolate for hundreds of years.   Distressed by this state of things, the
Divine Prince promptly rebuilt the palace and restored its former splendor, and in-
creased the family-allowances of the nobles, so that the people for the first time learned
the dignity of the emperor.   The last tai-kun,29 resuscitating a long-forgotten custom,
paid court to the emperor with dai myo in the fulness of the ceremony.   As for the
present tai-kun,3 as he has succeeded to the office after having lived in Kyoto for a
long time, the emperor reposes in him special confidence; so that, though some seek to
alienate them the one from the other, they hardly know how to apply their evil designs.
   "As regards the intercourse of the Japanese government with foreign Powers.
Formerly [people of] Portugal, England, and other lands, came; but, since the dis-
turbance of Amakusa,30 the tai-kun of the time issued edicts of exclusion, and per-
mitted trade only to the Chinese and the Hollanders.   Korea31 and Ryu-kyu31 send
envoys and tributes, the business concerning which is entrusted to the dai-myo nearest
to them.   In recent years, countries of the Occident have for the first time concluded
treaties with us, and their trade with us is increasing year by year.   The present tai-kun,
with his native ability, promotes the wealth and strength of the nation; therefore, he
seeks to deepen our friendship with the Western Powers, and to sweep away obsolete
customs and to lead [the nation] to enlightenment.   Progress has fairly begun.   The
Western nations are naturally unfamiliar with conditions in the Oriental countries;
especially difficult it must be to understand Japan, different as is her form of govern-
ment [from that of the Occidental Powers].   For this reason, we have endeavored
hereby to give a brief outline of the history since the beginning of our state, to describe
how the polity and the peace [of this land] have naturally resulted from its career of
the past six hundred years, and to explain the authority of our great work, the prin-
ciples of our government, and the exact condition of our administration, as obtain
under the present tai-kun after two hundred and sixty years of the successive rule [of
his predecessors].   It is sincerely hoped that the governments and peoples of the world
will understand the true state of things in Japan, and, without being misled by
momentary and unfounded rumors, will [cooperate with us to] increase our mutual
friendship and to promote security and happiness on both sides."




#155-B
                                          B
   (Tokugawa Yoshinobu ko den, VII, 183, from Premier Nijo's memorandum.)
   "As Yoshinobu,3 the subject32 [of His Imperial Majesty], respectfully examines the
history of this country, [he finds that] since of old the Imperial authority was relaxed,
the family of ministers10 assumed power, and, after the wars of Hogen and Heiji,33
P377
political authority was transferred to the military, his ancestor34 received special
Imperial favor, and his children have succeeded one another for more than two hundred
years.   Although the undersigned has accepted the office [of sho-gun], his government
and his administration of justice have not a little been at fault.   The [difficult] situa-
tion of the present day is ultimately due to his deficiency in virtue;19 for which he is
filled with humiliation.   Since the increasing intercourse with the foreign Powers renders
it all the more obvious that, unless all the authority of government were unified, it
would be impossible to secure control, he deems it his utmost service to the state to
revise the historic custom and to return13 his political power to the Imperial Govern-
ment, to seek exhaustively the public opinion35 of the country, and invoking Imperial
judgment, to protect the land in common accord with all,36 so that [the Empire] will
assuredly be able to stand side by side with the Powers of the world.   He has, however,
advised the barons to express themselves if they have any opinion [about his action].
Therefore, he respectfully memorializes thus to the Throne.
   "Tenth month fourteenth day [9 November 1867].                                       Yoshinobu."




#155-C
                                           C
(Dai-zho kwan nisshi, for Mei-ji 2y., No. 9; Shimadzu Hisamitsu ko zhikki, VII, 1-3; etc.)
"The undersigned subjects32 [of His Imperial Majesty petition] with reverent obei-
sance.   We respectfully opine that what the Imperial Government should not lose for a
single day is its great Polity, and what it should not loan 37 for a single day is its great
Authority.   The great Polity is:   that, since the Heavenly Ancestors for the first time
founded the state, the throne has been and shall forever be occupied in a single line of
succession; and that, within the realm, there is no territory which is not owned by the
Sovereign and no person who is not subject to him.   The great Authority is:   that [the
Imperial Government] has the sole power to give and to take; that it maintains its
servants by means of ranks and emoluments; and that no one shall presume privately
to own a single foot of land or privately to possess a single person.38   The ancient
Imperial Government controlled the realm exclusively upon these principles; the
Sovereign ruled in his sacred person.   Therefore, name agreed with reality, and the
country was at peace.   After the middle ages, when the cord of sovereign rule was once
relaxed, those who usurped authority in mutual rivalry infested the Imperial Govern-
ment, and those who possessed people and seized land filled a half of the country.
There resulted a habitual state of struggle and strife, which the imperial Government,
scarcely keeping its Polity and holding its Authority, was unable to control.   Forceful
men of evil design took advantage of this condition, and the stronger among them
devoured the weaker; great [seigneurs] annexed a dozen of kuni, while even small
[lords] maintained thousands of warriors.   As for the baku-fu39 so-called, it appor-
tioned at will land and people among its followers, thereby cultivating its own influence
and power.   Upon its pleasure was the Imperial Government constrained to depend,
merely upholding the insignia of sovereignty.   The progress of this evil movement has
swept everything before it for more than six hundred years.15   However, during this
interval, men sometimes borrowed37 rank and office from the Sovereign, in order to
disguise their private seizure of land and people; this was because the distinction
P378
between prince and subject had been unalterably established for all time.   Now, the
rule of the state has been restored anew, and the Sovereign again holds all powers in
his hands.   This is indeed the rarest of opportunities.   It is needful that name should be
accompanied by reality.   In order to obtain the reality, naught is more important than
to make clear the great principles [of state] and to establish the legality [of political
conduct].   When the house of Tokugawa rose to power,40 there were old families [of
lords ruling over] a half of the country, and others were raised [to rule over the re-
mainder]; and, no matter whether or not these families had originally received from
the Imperial Government the people and land [over which they ruled], they have kept
them to this day by the force of long standing custom.   Some would say that these had
been conquered by the forefathers at the point of the sword; how does such a state-
ment differ from declaring that what one had stolen from an official storehouse by an
armed invasion had been won at the risk of death?   Every one knows that an intruder
into a storehouse is a ruffian, but no one challenges a robber of territory and people;
to this pass has come the destruction of legality and principle.   Now that [the estab-
lishment of] a new regime is being sought, [it is essential that] what the great Polity
consists in and the great Authority depends upon should not in the least degree be
loaned.37   The abode where we the undersigned dwell is the Sovereign's land; the people
over whom we rule are his people.   Why should we privately own them?   Now, therefore,
we respectfully restore our domains to the Sovereign.   We pray that the Imperial
Government, according to its judgment, give [of them] what should be given41 and
take [from them] what should be taken away; that then an Imperial command be
issued that the domains of all the han be reorganized ; and also that all the regulations,
from the ordering of laws, insitutions,and military affairs, even unto the fashioning
of uniforms and instruments, issue from the Imperial Government, and the conduct of
all the affairs of the realm, whether great or small, be placed under unified control.
Then only, name and reality complementing each other, [the Empire] might stand
beside the foreign Powers.   Such [a consummation] is the urgent task of the Imperial
Government at the present moment, and is likewise the responsibility of the subjects.
Wherefore, we, the undersigned, disregarding our humble capacity, have ventured to
give expression to our opinion.   We pray that it be illumined by the brilliancy of the
Sovereign's [mind].   We, the undersigned, in reverent obeisance do thus supplicate.
       "The first month [March 1869].            Mori Sai-sho Chu-zho.42
                                                                Shimadzu sho-sho.43
                                                                Nabeshima sho-sho.44
                                                                Yamanouchi sho-sho."45



#155-D
                                                                            D
                                                  (Shimadzu Hisamitsu ko zhikki., VII, 14.)
                                                                                             "Shimadzu Sai-sho.46
   "As regards your offer of domain, we, after a deep consideration of the condition of
the times and an extensive adoption of public opinion,35 and with a view to unifying
government, accept [the offer] as has been proposed.
                         "The sixth month [July 1869].       Gyo-sei Kwan."47
P379



#155-E
                                                                             E
                                                     (Ibid., VII, 14.)
                                                                                             "Shimadzu Sai-sho.46
"you are hereby appointed Chi-zhi48 of Kagoshima han.
   "Mei-ji tsuchinoto-mi, 6 m. [July 1869]."

                                                                             F
                                                     (Ibid., VII, 13.)
                                                                                             "Shimadzu Sho-sho.48
"Taka, one hundred thousand koku.
   "By reason of your meritorious services, [the above] is granted for all time (ei-sei).
       Mei-ji 2 y. tsuchinoto-mi 6 m. [July 1869]."

                                                                             G
                                                     (The Iriki-in genealogy.)
                                                                                               "Iriki-in Dan-zho.49
   "In accordance with the
Imperial50 command, the family ranks of former times have been abolished, the
appellation shi-zoku has been fixed [for your family], and a hereditary emolument
(se-roku) of three hundred koku has been assigned [for your support].   However, in
consideration of the services of your forefathers, two hundred koku will be annually
granted to your from the treasury rice(kura-mai).
   "8th month [September 1870].
"The Chi-sei Zho."51



* The editor regrets that he decided to include A and B in the present No. too late to enable him to add their original texts to the Japanese section of this volume. 1 The word mikado, literally meaning (probably) gate or house-door, was used in early history, not only for the emperor, but also for the imperial residence and the imperial court, (like the word palatium in the Roman and Frankish periods), and even the whole state, and was rarely used in later ages, and almost never in official language, in the sense of emperor. The English word "emperor" is hardly apt when applied to the Japanese sovereign of the early ages, but-if we would employ a single word to designate the same institution throughout its history-seems preferable to mikado. It is unnecessary to yield to the desire to use an outlandish term merely because it seems odd enough to be applied to a strange thing. It would also seem ungracious to persist in the use of a name which probably would not please its subject. 2 Tai-kun, meaning great prince, is the term which the foreigners habitually applied to the sho- gun, the English writers often spelling it "tycoon." The word was never used in the technical sense by the sho-gun's own government; the late sho-gun, referring to the habit of the foreigners to call him by this word, remarked: "I do not know where they got it," (Tokugawa Yoshinobu ko-den, VII, 268). Fortunately it has fallen into disuse. 3 Tokugawa Yoshinobu, known often as Keiki from the Sinico-Japanese pronunciation of the two characters in which his personal name was written, was born in 1837, and became the fifteenth and last sho-gun of his house early in 1867. Retiring the following year, he died in 1913. 4 Yoshida Togo, I-shin shi hakko, pp. 251-252. 5Mei-ji zai-sei shi, VIII, 120-121. 6 The tenth Financial and economic annual, edited by the Treasury department of the Japanese government, pp. 30-31, 38. 7 Mei-ji zai-seishi, VIII, 10, 41-42, 45. 8 The first emperor, known by his posthumous name Zhimmu. P380 9 This follows the arbitrary chronology of the first official annal of Japan, Ni-hon sho-ki (Nihongi), compiled in 720; see the editor's Early institutional life, pp. 23-24. 10 This refers to the Fujiwara family, which after the eighth century gradually succeeded in monopolizing the more important offices of the imperial government. 11 Such is the self-justification of the shogunate for its usurpation of the political power of Japan 12 The first line of sho-gun was of the Minamoto family, which had descended from an imperial prince, but had long since been classed out of the imperial family. 13 This is the well-known theory of the power of the sho-gun as a trust(i-nin) from the sovereign. There is little legal ground for this theory, but the Tokugawa shogunate consistently asserted it, and even the imperial government acknowledged it in careless moments (Shimadzu Hisamitsu ko zhikki, IV, 38, in 1864), and also in the letter by which, in reply to B, the latter accepted the surrender of the sho-gun's hereditary rule of Japan, (Tokugawa Yoshinobu ko den, VII, 191; cf. II, 251-252; V, 235, 467, 468, 491; VI, 315, 404, 408, 417, 441, 489; etc.). 14 Adzukaru. 15 Minamoto Yoritomo established his government at Kamakura in 1184, and was appointed the first sho-gun in 1192. 16 This alludes to the feudal regime, as distinct from the earlier imperial government. 17 The Minamoto and the Hojo, ruling at Kamakura, 1192-1333; the Ashikaga, at Muromachi, Kyoto, 1336-1573; Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi, 1573-1598; and the Tokugawa, at Edo, 1600-1868. 18 C. 1200-c. 1600. 19 In the political philosophy of ancient China, moral virtue was considered the only reason for political power: appointment of Heaven would descend upon the most virtuous man in the country to become the ruler of the people; he should raise other virtuous persons to the various offices of government; when a ruler failed in virtue, he thereby lost his power, for his government would be disordered and the people be distressed and disloyal, and Heaven's affection be alienated; and it was justifiable for the most virtuous subject to rise in revolt and replace the vicious sovereign. (See the editor's Early institutional life, index, "virtue.") Even in China, these ideas could hardly be more than theories; and in Japan they were obviously incompatible with her imperial sovereignty, and were, therefore, never accepted in entirety even as theories. Nevertheless, the fundamental theory that the ruler should excel in virtue was unexceptionable; like the theory of justitia(righteousness) rather than justice) and mercy inculcated upon the ruling classes by the churchmen of the Middle Ages in Europe, (see, for example, Hincmar, De ordine palatii, 882, c. 5, 6, 9, and 25, where sentences occur which almost parallel the greater passages in the Shu king; cf. Imbart de la Tour, Questions d'histoire, 1907, pp. 155-162), the Oriental theory of virtue continued in China and Japan to be an ideal and a principle which wise rulers strove to realize in life, and which men invoked at critical moments. 20 Tokugawa Ieyasu is referred to, who unified all feudal Japan in 1600. As will be seen in this document (A), his successors deified his spirit as To-sho gu; see No. 154, n. 19. 21 The self-justification of the Tokugawa shogunate. 22 In 1221, the imperial court made an abortive attempt to make war upon the feudal government. 23 Emperor Go Dai-go succeeded in overthrowing the Hojo regency in 1333, but the real govern- ment of the country reverted to feudalism only three years later; see Nos. 74 and 82. 24 The original word which we have translated as territorial rule is ho-ken (Chinese fong-kien). The word had been adopted from the Chinese history of the Chou period, 1122-255 B.C., when the outer regions were assigned to the hereditary rule of men according to an elaborate system of division and control. It is not the early Chou system which the Tokugawa regime resembled, but its later quasi-feudal development, before it ultimately degenerated into a state of anarchy among independent, warring states, (see the editor's Early institutional life, pp. 190-195). The original fong- kien of Chou was hardly feudal in structure, but, probably from its subsequent disintegration, the word is often taken by writers to mean feudalism generally. In fact, there is no adequate word in Chinese or Japanese which reproduces the exact idea of feudalism, such as developed in Europe after the tenth century and in Japan after the thirteenth. In our text, it is apparently implied that the Minamoto regime was not a ho-ken, because the local chiefs of that period were warriors who had been established in the soil, and not the sho-gun's P381 own vassals whom he enfeoffed and distributed over the country as territorial lords; and that a ho-ken partially appeared under the Ashikaga, and was completely organized under the Tokugawa. There is a degree of historical insight in this interpretation, so far as ho-ken is concerned. At least this view is more accurate than the careless use of the term for all the feudal ages of Japan, as is customary among writers in that country. 25 Gun-ken (Chinese kun-hien), literally two units of local division, the first being inclusive of the second, but really meaning centralized local administration: in fact, the Tokugawa never used the unit ken. The term gun-ken was used in contrast with ho-ken (n. 24). The Tokugawa regime was a combination of feudalization and centralization, the former obtaining in the baronies and other fiefs and the latter in the sho-gun's own domains. The sho-gun's domains(go ryo or ko ryo), amounting in taka to about a fifth of the land of Japan, had been reserved for his own support. Unlike the hereditary fiefs with which he invested the barons and other vassals, these domains were administered by his agents who were responsible for their official conduct directly to his council and were removable at will. The institutional position which the domains occupied in feudal Japan as a whole corresponded, therefore, to that of the domains(kura-iri) of the Shimadzu baron in his barony. In this and other respects, the various baronies were as many miniatures of the whole of Japan under the rule of the sho-gun 26 For the ceremony by which the chevalier attained majority, see No. 58, n. 7, and No. 134. 27 For the vermilion seal(shu-in), see No. 151, n. 11. 28 This baron of Kaga, of the Maeda family, held the largest barony, aggregating 1,022,700 koku in taka. In the magnitude of the fiefs measured in taka, the Shimadzu barony, 770,800 koku, stood second only to that of the Maeda, in 1865; next in order, in that year, came the baronies of:-the Date, at Sendai, Mutsu, (625,600); the Tokugawa, at Nagoya, Owari, (619,500); another branch of the Tokugawa, at Wakayama, Kii (Kishu, 555,000); the Hosokawa, at Kumamoto, Higo, in Kyu-shu (540,000); the Kuroda, at Fukuoka, Chikuzen, in Kyu-shu (520,000); and the Asano, at Hiroshima, Aki (426,000); then followed 257 lesser baronies. Technically, only the barons whose fiefs amounted to 10,000 koku or more were entitled dai-myo. Smaller lords holding fiefs directly of the sho-gun were called hata-moto (For the volume of koku, see Nos. 18 and 49.) 29 Iemochi, the fourteenth Tokugawa sho-gun, 1866. 30 This alludes to the so-called Christian revolt at Amakusa and Shimabara, Hizen, in north- western Kyu-shu. Goaded by persecution, the more ambitious of the Catholics at these places began in 1637 to resist local attempts at suppression. Finally, gathering an army of more than 30,000 men, the rebels took the castle of Hara, and there defended themselves against the 124,000 men of the besieging army led by barons of northern Kyu-shu and the two special commissioners sent by the sho-gun. It was only after three months of investment that the rebellion was completely crushed, in April 1638. Further see Iriki-in genealogy, under Shigetaka. This event led the Tokugawa shogunate to redouble its effort to exterminate Catholicism in all parts of the country. The story of the revolt and of the persecution in general has been well told by the late Captain Brinkley and Murodoch in their histories of Japan. Latterly Professor M. Anesaki has published an interesting study of the persecution after 1638 under the title Kirishitan shu-mon no haku-gai to sen-puku, Tokyo, 1925. 31 The relation between Korea and Japan had had a long and checkered career, now amicable and then hostile. The Koreans took part in the unsuccessful invasions of the Mongols into Japan in the latter half of the thirteenth century; and twice, in 1389 and 1419, attacked Tsushima and were repulsed. Japan, on her part, invaded Korea at least twice: once before the beginning of the authentic history of the former country, (as is proven by the inscription on the monument for King Hau-t'ai wang), and again in the late sixteenth century, (see No. 150). During the Tokugawa shogunate, peace between the two countries was restored, and Korea sent envoys and presents both to China and Japan. The feudal government at Edo gave the So barons of Tsushima a right of immediate intercourse and trade with Korea. The eighteen islands of Ryu-kyu had been tributary to China since the latter part of the four- teenth century, but also held diplomatic and trade relations with Satsuma after 1441, and occa- sionally sent envoys to the sho-gun. This amicable relation with Japan was severed by Ryu-kyu from the end of the sixteenth century. The Shimadzu baron, with the sho-gun's permission, sent an army to the main island of the little kingdom and annexed it as part of his dominion, bringing five of its other islands under his direct rule. Henceforth, Ryu-kyu continued to bear tributes to P382 both China and Satsuma (and also to Edo); and Satsuma enjoyed a trade monopoly with the islands throughout the Tokugawa period. In 1853, Commodore Matthew Perry forced a treaty upon Ryu-kyu, and France and Holland followed his example and likewise concluded treaties, thus treating Ryu-kyu as an independent state. In 1871, the Japanese imperial government placed the islands under its direct control, and assumed their treaty obligations to the Powers; and seven years later organized the archipelago as a ken(prefecture) under the name Okinawa. China had, in a thoughtless moment, renounced her protectorate over the islands. 32 Shin, subject. This word implied a public, non-feudal subjection to a sovereign, but the feudal barons as territorial lords had often applied the term to their own vassals. The compilers of the official history of the Shimadzu barony, Shimadzu koku-shi, used the word throughout its record of the history from its beginning, when the lord was but a private chieftain with extremely limited powers in the territory over which he was to assume practical autonomy only centuries later. 33 The wars of the year-periods Ho-gen (1156) and Hei-ji (1159) decided a temporary ascendency of the Taira over the Minamoto. The latter, in turn, prevailed over the former in 1180-1185. 34 Tokugawa Ieyasu. 35 Ko-gi, literally, public discussion. Ko-ron, the phrase that occurs in the five-article oath of the emperor pronounced in 1868, in which he gave a clear enunciation of the enlightened principles of his new government, has an identical meaning. The history of the use of this comprehensive word ko has often been explained in this volume (No. 13, n. 7 a and n. 12; No. 26, n. 2; No. 49, n. 13; No. 89 A; No. 107, n. 4 and 5; No. 152, n. 2; No. 146, n. 10). Now, in the new age, that side of the double significance of this word (No. 142, n. 2) which had long been overshadowed by the other,-that is to say, "public,"-emerged in full force. This very fact indicates the awakened con- sciousness in the new era that, below the "authorities" (which is the other half of the meaning of ko), there was a growing "public" which, though not sovereign, and though still very restricted in size and in political intelligence, none the less had its own opinion and was articulate. It is in- structive to reflect that this new phase in the history of the little word is symptomatic of the suddenly altered life of the nation. 36 The last part of this sentence reveals the state of mind in which the sho-gun yielded his powers: he was unwilling altogether to obliterate himself from the political life of Japan, but desired to serve as the lord of a great barony under imperial control, and to take part in the government of the country in a new capacity. This is further shown in his words and conduct after his resignation, (Tokugawa Yoshinobu ko den, VII, 188, 211-212, 243-244, 253, 271). 37 Kasu, to loan, would in German be accurately rendered as leihen and verleihen, or lehen>. To borrow is karu. 38 What are here called polity and authority are nothing other than the principles, respectively, of the sovereignty of the ruler and of the centralization of his government: the sovereign rights were vested in the emperor, not the people, and could only be delegated by him to his agents; his government should be centralized, controlling all public functions and all local officials. These were the principles which, having been adopted from China, formed the basis of the reorganization of the Japanese state-system undertaken in the seventh century. The same principles now inspired the signers of this document to make this memorable petition; they would restore these principles, which had been inoperative for centuries; furthermore, they deduced therefrom the clear and bold assertion that the feudal rule was essentially a usurpation. As a matter of fact, the new government itself, to which the petition was addressed, had been conceived in the same spirit. It was for this reason that the establishment of the new regime was and is generally called the "restoration" of the imperial government; in reality, this fiction, although it still crops out in occasional official docu- ments, was soon modified by the adoption from the Occident of a new principle: popular repre- sentation. Expositions of the old principles will be found in the present editor's Early institutional life of Japan, and in his work on the feudal regime of southern Kyu-shu, which is in preparation. 39 This is the term used for the government of the sho-gun, suzerain of feudal Japan. Baku-fu literally meant tent-government, a modest term chosen by the first line of sho-gun to designate its simple, half-private and almost provisional government established at Kamakura. 40 In 1600; see No. 151. 41 It is apparent that what the patriotic petitioners desired was , not to abolish fiefs and to do P383 away altogether with the quasi-feudal regime to which they had been accustomed, but to receive a species of fiefs directly from the emperor; not a constitutional government, but a sort of a cen- tralized imperial feudalism. Only a handful of men at this early date foresaw the untenability of such an arrangement. Even as the sho-gun, when he resigned his office in 1867, secretly entertained the hope to receive a high place in the new government (n.36), so the signer of this petition were still fettered by the unexpressed desire to be granted parts of their proffered domains as fiefs under the central government or else to maintain in some measure their wonted authority as local chiefs. It will be seen in the documents C and D that this natural desire was gratified by the imperial government. Things, however, moved swiftly, and no such half-measure could long be tolerated: in 1871, as has been said in our preface to this No., the han was abolished, the semi-feudal lord- governor was dismissed, and the local government of the empire was reorganized on the basis of a centralized bureaucracy; public servants were raised from among recent vassals of all grades, and appointed governors of the newly created districts, often away from their places of origin. 42 Mori Takachika, baron of Yamaguchi, Suwo; popularly called lord of Cho-shu, i.e., Ngato, for this kunialso he ruled over. 43 Shimadzu Tadayoshi, baron of Satsuma(Sasshu), Osumi, and part of Hiuga. 44 Nabeshima Naohiro, baron of Saga, Hizen. 45 Yamanouchi Toyoshige, baron of Kochi, Tosa. 46 Shimadzu Hisamitsu, uncle of Tadayoshi. Hisamitsu, although he was not the lineal baron of Shimadzu, was older than Tadayoshi and was commanding figure in the whole movement which brought about the downfall of the Tokugawa shogunate and the installation of the new govern- ment. 47 The executive bureau of the new imperial government at Tokyo. To Tokyo, the old Edo, the seat of the late shogunate, the imperial Capital had been transferred from Kyoto in the preceding year, the 1073d year after its establishment in the latter city. 48 Governor. 49 Kimihiro, the twenty-ninth lord of Iriki. 50 Pursuing the historic custom originally adopted from China, the word is written at the head of a new line out respect for the imperial house, the custom which was discarded soon after. 51 The executive office of the Satsuma han. It may be presumed that the 300 koku were the emolument granted by the imperial government through the instrumentality of the Shimadzu governor, and the 200 koku were given by the latter out of his own annuity, perhaps for life. Thus, like the former lord himself, the former vassal also was given an anomalous status though in a different way, as a retainer at once of the central government and of the local governor, his heredi- tary lord.